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PROSECUTORIAL VENTRILOQUISM:  
PEOPLE V. TOM AND THE SUBSTANTIVE USE 
OF POST-ARREST, PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE 
TO INFER CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT 
Joshua Bornstein∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
Will Rogers wisely wrote, “Never miss a good chance to shut 
up.”1 In California, a criminal suspect in police custody, who follows 
this once sage advice, may now find his post-arrest silence used 
against him at trial.2 The recent California Supreme Court case, 
People v. Tom,3 held that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination is not violated when the government uses a 
defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence 
of guilt.4 In so holding, the Tom court reached a decision that was 
impractical and counterintuitive.5 
Part II of this Comment details the facts of People v. Tom. Part 
III sets forth the historical background behind the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. After analyzing the reasoning of 
the court in Part IV, Part V considers the implications and 
shortcomings of the court’s holding in Tom. Finally, Part VI 
concludes that Tom was incorrectly decided because it has the 
potential to lead to unfair results not in concert with the spirit of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to Professor
Marcy Strauss for her guidance and valuable feedback in preparing this Comment. Thank you to 
the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and dedication. A 
special thank you to my wife, daughter, parents, mother-in-law, and extended family for their 
unyielding and unconditional love and support. Dedicated to the memory of “Weezy.” 
1. THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF WILL ROGERS, http://www.cmgww.com/historic/rogers
/about/miscellaneous.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
2. See People v. Tom (Tom II), 331 P.3d 303 (Cal. 2014).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 305.
5. See infra Part V.
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Factual Background
On the night of February 19, 2007, Richard Tom got behind the 
wheel of his Mercedes E320.6 He had been drinking.7 How much he 
had to drink that evening is unknown.8 What is not disputed, 
however, is that Tom’s Mercedes crashed into another vehicle, 
killing one of its passengers and seriously injuring the remaining 
two.9 
When police first arrived, Tom was still behind the wheel of his 
Mercedes.10 After paramedics inspected him, Tom waited inside a 
friend’s car, which was parked near the scene of the accident.11 
Fifteen minutes later, a police officer approached the car.12 Tom 
asked the officer if he was free to walk home.13 The officer rejected 
Tom’s request, stating that the circumstances “obviously” constituted 
an ongoing investigation.14 
About an hour after police first arrived at the scene, another 
officer, Sergeant Alan Bailey, discovered Tom waiting in his friend’s 
car.15 Sergeant Bailey ordered that Tom be placed in the backseat of 
a patrol vehicle.16 While there, Tom was not handcuffed.17 Sergeant 
Bailey asked if Tom would submit to a voluntary blood alcohol 
test.18 Tom agreed and was taken to the police station because blood 
could not be drawn at the scene.19 
A paramedic was dispatched to draw Tom’s blood.20 However, 
the city’s contract with the paramedic company did not authorize a 
blood draw for suspects who had not been placed under arrest.21 
6. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 306.
7. Id. at 305.
8. Id.
9. People v. Tom (Tom I), 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 331 P.3d
303 (Cal. 2014). 





15. Id. at 306–08.
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Because Tom had not been officially arrested,22 he was asked if he 
would be willing to go to the hospital to get his blood drawn there.23 
Tom asked whether he had a right to refuse this blood test.24 In 
response, Tom was told that it would be “in his interest to prove that 
he had nothing in his system.”25 
Shortly thereafter, while still at the police station, Tom used the 
restroom.26 Sergeant Bailey accompanied him.27 While in the 
restroom, Sergeant Bailey noticed the smell of alcohol coming from 
Tom.28 Three field sobriety tests were then administered.29 Officers 
determined that Tom was intoxicated.30 At this point, Tom was 
officially placed under arrest.31 Prior to his arrest, Tom never asked 
any of the police officers about the welfare of the other people 
involved in the collision.32 
B. Procedural History
1. The Trial
Tom was charged with “gross vehicular manslaughter while 
intoxicated, driving under the influence causing harm to another, and 
driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or higher causing harm 
to another, along with various enhancement allegations.”33 At trial, 
Tom never testified.34 
During the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, the district attorney used 
the fact that Tom never asked about the wellbeing of the passengers 
in the other car to prove that he acted with gross negligence.35 This, 
it appears, likely carried significant weight with the jury.36 
22. The appellate court determined that Tom was under de facto arrest during the time when
he was transported to the police station in a patrol vehicle. See id. at 310. 










33. Id. at 305.
34. Tom I, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 331 P.3d 303 (Cal. 2014).
35. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 309, 332.
36. Id. at 332 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“Given [the] conflicting expert testimony [as to Tom’s
speed], the prosecutor’s emphasis on Tom’s failure to ask about the crash victims was a 
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The district attorney argued before the jury that it was 
“particularly offensive” that Tom “never, ever asked, hey, how are 
the people in the other car doing? Not once . . . Because he knew he 
had done a very, very, very bad thing, and he was scared. He was 
scared or—either that or too drunk to care.”37 At the conclusion of 
the trial, the jury acquitted Tom of the alcohol-related charges but 
convicted him of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence.38 
The court sentenced Tom to seven years in prison.39 
Tom filed an appeal asserting multiple grounds for reversal of 
the judgment, including deprivation of his constitutional rights, 
prosecutorial misconduct, improper admission of opinion testimony, 
prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and sentencing error.40 Tom also collaterally 
attacked the judgment through a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.41 The California appellate court consolidated the two cases.42 
2. Appellate Court
The appellate court first determined that Tom was under de facto 
arrest prior to being transported to the police station because the stop 
was neither “temporary” nor “brief.”43 The court reached this 
determination based upon the fact that Tom was held at the scene for 
over an hour—in “an increasingly coercive” situation—and was not 
free to leave.44 Under the totality of the circumstances, the court 
found “the police restraints placed upon [Tom] ripened into those 
‘tantamount to a formal arrest’ when police transported defendant 
from the accident scene in a patrol car.”45 
After determining that Tom was “in custody for Miranda 
purposes,” the appellate court then addressed whether the district 
attorney’s references to Tom’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
significant aspect of her claim that Tom ‘was driving down that night . . . without a care of what 
was going to happen. I don’t care is the attitude that he had.’”). 
37. Id. at 309.
38. Id. at 305–06.
39. Id. at 306.
40. Tom I, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 73–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 331 P.3d 303 (Cal.
2014). 
41. Id. at 74.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 83 (relying upon and distinguishing from the holding of Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420 (1984)). 
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting People v. Pilster, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
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violated Tom’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.46 
The appellate court held, “the right of pretrial silence under Miranda 
is triggered by the inherently coercive circumstances attendant to a 
de facto arrest and therefore the government may not introduce 
evidence in its case-in-chief of a defendant’s silence after arrest, but 
before Miranda warnings are administered, as substantive evidence 
of defendant’s guilt.”47 Following the appellate court’s decision, the 
People petitioned for, and the California Supreme Court granted, 
review.48 That court limited its focus to the admissibility of Tom’s 
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence under the Fifth Amendment.49 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause states, “No 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”50 In the seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona,51 the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered this privilege in the context of 
custodial interrogation.52 The Miranda Court held that a 
prosecutor “may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination.”53 These safeguards were explicated in the 
now-famous Miranda warnings. 
Prior to custodial interrogation, an individual must “be warned 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make 
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the 
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”54 Miranda 
requires “that a person taken into custody be advised immediately 
that he has the right to remain silent.”55 
46. Id. at 84.
47. Id. at 88.
48. Tom II, 331 P.3d 303, 310 (Cal. 2014).
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id.
55. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
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At trial, a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s refusal 
to testify at trial.56 A prosecutor, however, is not categorically barred 
from addressing a criminal defendant’s pretrial silence.57 For 
example, when a criminal defendant takes the stand in his own 
defense, “[t]he prosecution may use a defendant’s pretrial silence as 
impeachment, provided the defendant [had] not yet been 
Mirandized.”58 
On the other hand, a criminal defendant may not be impeached 
by his post-Miranda silence.59 Courts distinguish the difference 
between pre- and post-Miranda silence based upon the reliance that 
the Miranda warnings elicit.60 “[W]hile it is true that the Miranda 
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no 
penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the 
warnings.”61 
A suspect in custody who wishes to invoke his privilege against 
self-incrimination must do so objectively and unambiguously.62 This 
objective invocation rule is intended to give “guidance to officers on 
how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.”63 Therefore, 
counter-intuitively, in order to invoke one’s right to remain silent 
prior to interrogation, an individual must speak and convey 
unambiguously to an arresting officer that he wishes to utilize his 
privilege against self-incrimination.64 Put differently, prior to 
receiving a Miranda warning, silence alone does not activate the 
right to remain silent.65 While the privilege exists, it is not 
self-activating.66 
56. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
57. Tom II, 331 P.3d 303, 311 (Cal. 2014).
58. Id.
59. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611 (holding that after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of
his arrest, a defendant may not be impeached through cross-examination about his failure to tell 
an exculpatory story prior to trial). 
60. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (“In the absence of the sort of affirmative
assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of 
law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to 
take the stand.”). 
61. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
62. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010).
63. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 453, 458–59 (1994)).
64. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (“Although ‘no ritualistic formula is
necessary in order to invoke the privilege,’ . . . a witness does not do so by simply standing 
mute.”) (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955)). 
65. Id.
66. Id.
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In Salinas v. Texas,67 the U.S. Supreme Court applied the 
objective invocation rule outside the context of custodial 
interrogation.68 There, the police questioned the petitioner, Salinas, 
about a homicide they were investigating.69 During this interview, 
Salinas was not in custody nor had he been given a Miranda 
warning.70 Salinas freely answered the police’s questions until he 
was asked whether the shell casings found at the crime scene would 
match his shotgun.71 Then, Salinas fell silent, looked at the floor, and 
bit his lip.72 At Salinas’ murder trial, despite the fact that Salinas did 
not testify, the prosecutors argued that his silence was evidence of 
his guilt.73 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion held that pre-custodial, 
pre-Miranda silence could be used against a criminal defendant 
during the prosecution’s case-in-chief as substantive evidence of 
guilt.74 
The Salinas plurality noted that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination is “not an unqualified right.”75 Nor is it 
“self-executing.”76 A witness who seeks its protection “must claim 
it.”77 Therefore, during noncustodial police interviews—where 
Miranda warnings typically are not given—one must “assert the 
privilege in order to benefit from it.”78 
Salinas dealt exclusively with pre-arrest silence.79 There is no 
definitive Supreme Court decision on the government’s use of 
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. Currently, there exists both state 
and circuit splits on the issue of whether the government’s 
substantive use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence violates the Fifth 
Amendment. For example, in the Ninth Circuit case United States v. 
Velarde-Gomez,80 Ramon Velarde-Gomez was arrested for importing 
67. 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2177.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2178.
73. Id. at 2177–78.
74. Id. at 2184.
75. Id. at 2182–83.




80. 269 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
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and possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute.81 At trial, the 
government elicited testimony about Velarde-Gomez’s post-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence in response to questions from border agents.82 
This silence was characterized as “demeanor” evidence.83 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that “the government 
may not burden [the] right [to remain silent] by commenting on the 
defendant’s post-arrest silence at trial.”84 This was because “once the 
government places an individual in custody, that individual has a 
right to remain silent in the face of government questioning, 
regardless of whether the Miranda warnings are given.”85 
Conversely, in the Eighth Circuit case United States v. Frazier,86 
the defendant, Frazier, was arrested with large quantities of 
pseudoephedrine, a drug used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine.87 At trial, the arresting officer testified that when 
Frazier was arrested, “his reaction was neither angry, surprised, nor 
combative. Frazier did not say anything when the officers told him 
why he was being arrested.”88 During closing argument, the 
prosecutor commented that Frazier’s silence was not indicative of an 
innocent person, who likely would become “combative, angry, 
emotional, [or] demanding.”89 
The Eighth Circuit stressed that the relevant inquiry should 
focus on when an individual would feel an “official compulsion to 
speak.”90 The Frazier court noted, “Although Frazier was under 
arrest, there was no governmental action at that point inducing his 
silence. Thus he was under no government-imposed compulsion to 
speak.”91 Accordingly, the court held “the use of Frazier’s silence in 
the government’s case-in-chief as evidence of guilt did not violate 
his Fifth Amendment rights.”92 
81. Id. at 1025.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1029.
85. Id.; accord State v. Mainaaupo, 178 P.3d 1, 18 (Haw. 2008).
86. 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2005).
87. Id. at 1105.
88. Id. at 1107.
89. Id. at 1109.
90. Id. at 1110.
91. Id. at 1111.
92. Id.; accord People v. Schollaert, 486 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT IN TOM
In Tom, the California Supreme Court faced an issue of first 
impression for California state law.93 That issue was whether the 
Fifth Amendment is violated when the government uses a 
defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief as 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt.94 To resolve the issue, the Tom 
court first noted the split amongst state courts and federal circuits on 
the issue.95 The court then briefly traced the origins of the objective 
invocation rule to illustrate one of the rule’s rationales: to 
“provide . . . guidance to officers on how to proceed in the face of 
ambiguity.”96 Next, the court analyzed Salinas, which applied the 
objective invocation rule outside the context of custodial 
interrogation.97 
The Tom court noted the Salinas plurality’s emphasis that the 
privilege against self-incrimination is an exception to the general rule 
“that the Government has the right to everyone’s testimony” such 
that if one “desires the protection of the privilege . . . [one] must 
claim it.”98 The Tom court focused on the “need to avoid difficulties 
of proof and the need to provide guidance to law enforcement 
officers.”99 The court found no distinction between the invocation 
requirements before and after custody. As such, the court concluded 
that the objective invocation rule applies to post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence just as it does to pre-arrest situations.100 Accordingly, because 
Tom did not invoke his privilege against self-incrimination at the 
time of his de facto arrest, the government did not violate his Fifth 
Amendment rights by using his silence as substantive evidence of 
guilt.101 
93. Tom II, 331 P.3d 303, 305 (2014).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 311–12 (Minnesota, Vermont, Michigan, Kentucky, and the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits hold that the government’s substantive use of a defendant’s post-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Hawaii and the Ninth, Tenth, and 
D.C. Circuits hold that the government’s use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as
substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment.).
96. Id. at 312 (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (quoting another
source). 
97. Id. at 312–13.
98. Id. at 313 (quoting Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013)).
99. Id. (quoting Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013)).
100. Id. at 314.
101. Id. at 314–15.
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V. ANALYSIS
“At this point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar 
with the concept, if not the language,” of the Miranda warnings.102 
These warnings “have become part of our national culture.”103 Yet, 
few people likely know how to adequately assert their privilege 
against self-incrimination or even that there is a right to remain silent 
when merely being questioned by the police.104 The rule requiring 
individuals under pre-Miranda custody to objectively and 
unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent is counterintuitive, 
and may produce results that run counter to “commonsense 
expectations.”105 Simply put, it is against common sense that one 
must first speak in order to invoke the privilege of silence.106 
This Part first addresses the impracticability of the objective 
invocation rule for pre-Miranda custody. Next, this Part discusses 
the evidentiary implications of the Tom ruling. Finally, this Part 
addresses the potential for abuse that might result from the holding in 
Tom. 
A. Impracticability of the Express Invocation Rule
for Pre-Miranda Custody 
Prior to a Miranda warning, an individual might be aware of a 
privilege protecting oneself against self-incrimination. Following 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, however, one might not know 
that in order to invoke that privilege, paradoxically, one must speak 
up.107 Rather than simply remaining silent, prior to custodial 
interrogation, an individual must objectively inform the police that 
the Fifth Amendment is being invoked.108 While the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that “no ritualistic formula is required,”109 demanding 
an objective and unambiguous expression of one’s desire to remain 
silent appears to have the effect of a formalistic requirement. 
102. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
103. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
104. Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Silence Is Not Golden, Supreme Court Says, ABA J.
(June 25, 2013, 6:15 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_silence_is_no 
t_golden_supreme_court_says/. 
105. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 323 (Liu, J., dissenting).
106. Chemerinsky, supra note 104.
107. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013).
108. See id. at 2180–81.
109. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955); Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
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While the plurality opinion of Salinas is controversial to 
some,110 Salinas dealt exclusively with pre-custodial situations. Prior 
to custody, an individual is generally free to leave at any time.111 The 
Salinas Court took notice of this difference in determining that there 
was a lack of government coercion.112 
In Tom, Tom’s silence occurred during de facto arrest.113 “After 
a person has been arrested, . . . the context is different,” and a 
suspect’s silence in this context “gives rise to a much stronger 
inference of reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege than a 
witness’s noncustodial silence.”114 This is because once arrest 
occurs, “‘official suspicions’ have ripened into probable cause for 
arrest [and] a suspect’s silence correspondingly becomes more 
suggestive of fear of self-incrimination.”115 
Justice Goodwin Liu’s dissent in Tom recognized that had Tom 
received a Miranda warning, the prosecutor would have been 
forbidden to use his silence in its case-in-chief.116 As the majority in 
Tom stated, “[t]he line between custody and custodial interrogation is 
a significant one.”117 Undeniably, custodial interrogation requires a 
Miranda warning whereas mere custody does not.118 However, a 
Miranda warning is often given when a person is first arrested.119 
Indeed, Miranda “require[s] that a person taken into custody be 
advised immediately” of one’s rights.120 
110. See Neal Davis & Dick Deguerin, Silence Is No Longer Golden: How Lawyers Must
Now Advise Suspects in Light of Salinas v. Texas, THE CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2014, at 16. 
111. See, e.g., Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2181 (noting Salinas agreed to accompany officers and
was free to leave at any time during the interview). There are circumstances, however, where an 
individual is neither free to leave nor in police custody. For example, Terry stops are considered 
non-custodial for Miranda purposes. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010) (“[T]he 
temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop . . . does 
not constitute Miranda custody.”) (citations omitted). 
112. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2181–82.
113. Tom II, 331 P.3d 303, 310 (Cal. 2014).
114. Id. at 331 (Liu, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 323.
117. Id. at 315 (majority opinion).
118. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
119. When Must the Police Read Me My Miranda Rights?, LAWINFO, http://resources
.lawinfo.com/criminal-law/when-must-the-police-read-me-my-miranda-right.html (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2016); see also McClure v. Indiana, 803 N.E.2d 210, 214 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“We 
would be remiss if we did not point out that the best practice in a situation such as this one would 
be to advise the defendant of the Miranda warnings when he is initially placed in custody.”). 
120. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
328 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:317 
The likely reason why Tom was not given any Miranda 
warnings during the period of silence used by the prosecution was 
because the police did not believe that Tom had been placed into 
“custody.”121 Indeed, the paramedic would not draw Tom’s blood at 
the police station because Tom had not been “placed under arrest.”122 
It was the determination of the appellate court—not the police—that 
Tom was under de facto arrest while he was being driven to the 
station.123 Therefore, because the police mistakenly believed Tom 
“was not in ‘custody,’” he did not receive a Miranda warning until 
after he was formally arrested. This mistake by the police determined 
the admissibility of Tom’s silence during his trial. At issue, then, is 
whether the Miranda warnings are rights activated by their formal 
recitation, or whether the warnings merely restate a pre-existing 
right. 
The Miranda warnings serve as “a prophylactic means of 
safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights.”124 “[The] warnings are not 
[themselves] the source of the rights stated in the warnings.”125 The 
holding of Tom, however, turns the Miranda warnings from a 
safeguard of the Fifth Amendment rights into the rights themselves. 
Unless a suspect objectively invokes the Fifth Amendment 
preemptively, one’s post-arrest silence is only protected by and 
through the police’s decision to read that suspect his rights. Yet, if a 
person does not know his or her rights, how can he or she invoke 
them prior to being informed? Moreover, if an individual must wait 
for the police to read him his rights in order to benefit from their 
protection, then the Fifth Amendment no longer exists as a right 
belonging to the individual. Rather, it becomes a privilege granted at 
the discretion of the police. 
Additionally, without a Miranda warning, an individual in 
custody may fear that unilaterally invoking the Fifth Amendment 
may signal to the arresting officers a consciousness of guilt. 
121. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 308.
122. Id.
123. Tom I, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 90 (Cal. App. Ct. 2012), rev’d, 331 P.3d 303 (2014).
124. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
125. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 325 (Liu, J., dissenting).
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Counterintuitively, this is the inference that can only be drawn if the 
individual does not invoke his or her rights.126 
Even if a suspect knows he or she must objectively invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination, pre-Miranda custody may not 
lend itself to easy invocation. As noted in Justice Liu’s dissent, 
because Miranda warnings must be given prior to custodial 
interrogation, it is likely that police are not directly interacting with a 
suspect in custody prior to interrogation.127 To whom and how 
should one invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege?128 Is one required 
to approach an officer on one’s own initiative and publicly announce 
that one does not wish to speak?129 Is telling one officer, telling all, 
or must one invoke the Fifth Amendment each time one interacts 
with an officer? 
Unlike with noncustodial situations where an individual is 
generally free to leave, after arrest, a criminal suspect’s mobility is 
severely restricted. Objectively asserting the Fifth Amendment may 
prove difficult in these circumstances.130 All the while, the suspect’s 
silence would still be available to the prosecution. 
While warnings are required before police seek to elicit a 
statement from a suspect, no warnings are required before 
interrogation commences.131 Yet, where pre-Miranda silence may be 
used as substantive evidence of guilt, that silence is effectively 
treated as a “statement.” Warnings, therefore, should be given 
earlier, at the moment of police custody, and they should include an 
additional clause explaining the affect one’s silence may have in 
court.132 Precluding pre-Miranda custodial silence as substantive 
evidence of guilt, however, would create a simpler solution by 
eliminating this need. 
126. See id. at 311 (majority opinion) (holding that one must objectively invoke the right to
remain silent in order to prevent prosecutorial use of pre-Miranda silence as evidence showing 
consciousness of guilt). 
127. Id. at 324 (Liu, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 332.
131. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
132. See Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 144 (2001) (“If the government
and courts want to include evidence of silence, then presumably all they need to do is add a 
sentence to the Miranda warnings: And if you do stay silent, this can be introduced if you take the 
stand in a subsequent trial.”). 
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B. Evidentiary Implications
“Every post-arrest silence in insolubly ambiguous.”133 
Therefore, when a prosecutor comments on a defendant’s silence, 
broad inferences can be drawn—inferences that might not accurately 
reflect the thoughts of the defendant. Inferring meaning from the 
words a defendant never spoke enables that prosecutor to speak on 
behalf of the defendant. This kind of prosecutorial ventriloquism 
effectively places the defendant on a virtual stand. Presented with 
these circumstances, a criminal defendant is faced with the “cruel 
trilemma of incriminating himself, lying, or demonstrating his guilt 
by silence.”134 
Choosing to testify at one’s own trial is a strategic choice, which 
can open the door to impeachment possibilities otherwise 
impermissible against a criminal defendant.135 Notably, Tom never 
testified at his trial.136 In a similar case involving post-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence, the D.C. Circuit noted, “[A] prosecutor’s 
comment on a defendant’s post-custodial silence unduly burdens that 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at trial, as it calls 
a jury’s further attention to the fact that he has not arisen to remove 
whatever taint the pretrial but post-custodial silence may have 
spread.”137 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that a prosecutor’s 
use of a defendant’s post-custodial silence is an inadmissible 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.138 
In Tom, Justice Liu’s dissent further illuminated the ideas 
espoused by the D.C. Circuit. Justice Liu argued that such 
prosecutorial comment evokes the kind of governmental coercion 
against which Miranda sought to protect.139 “The element of 
compulsion arises from the fact that allowing adverse comment on 
silence puts pressure on the defendant to take the witness stand, 
thereby undermining ‘the central purpose of the privilege—to protect 
a defendant from being the unwilling instrument of his or her own 
condemnation.’”140 
133. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (citation omitted).
134. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 328 (Liu, J., dissenting).
135. See FED. R. EVID. 607–09; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 785–88 (West 2015).
136. Tom I, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 331 P.3d 303 (Cal. 2014).
137. United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
138. Id. at 389.
139. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 327 (Liu, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999)).
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The pressure created from a prosecutor’s comment on a 
defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may result in shifting 
the burden onto the defendant, forcing him to take the stand in order 
to refute the meaning of his silence.141 If the defendant then takes the 
stand, he would be opening the door to witness and character 
impeachment otherwise impermissible under the applicable rules of 
evidence.142 The adversarial nature of criminal proceedings, coupled 
with the potential for loss of life and liberty, should forbid such 
inferences to be drawn based solely on the technical differences 
between whether or not a Miranda warning was given. The holding 
of Tom not only allows for prosecutorial comment on pre-Miranda 
silence, but also places the defendant in the difficult position of 
either testifying on his behalf in order to explicate the meaning of his 
silence or face the inference that he tacitly approves of the 
prosecutor’s interpretation of his silence. 
C. Potential for Abuse
Even with a lawyer’s understanding of the objective invocation 
rule, ambiguity still exists during pre-Miranda custody in California. 
In the Ninth Circuit, which encompasses California, prosecutorial 
comment on post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is impermissible.143 
Because the use of post-custodial, pre-Miranda silence is 
jurisdictionally different at the state and federal levels, the law 
“causes confusion for anyone arrested in California on a question 
that is always important: If I remain silent, can my silence be used 
against me or not?”144 
Justice Liu’s dissent argued that this disparity in the law invites 
forum shopping by prosecutors.145 For example, nearly fifty percent 
of the inmates in federal prisons have been incarcerated on drug 
charges.146 Depending on the circumstances, a California suspect 
141. Id. at 328.
142. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 785–88 (West 2015).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
government may not comment on a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in its case-in-
chief because such comments would ‘act . . . as an impermissible penalty on the exercise of 
the . . . right to remain silent.’”) (quoting United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 636–38 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
144. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 324 (Liu, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Offenses, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics
_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Dec. 26, 2015). 
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arrested on a drug offense may be tried by either the state or federal 
government. If the defendant’s pre-Miranda silence is believed to be 
a potentially dispositive factor at trial—as may have been the 
situation in Tom147—then the defendant’s case may be brought in 
state court so that his silence may be used against him. This disparity 
in the law transforms the right to remain silent into a privilege 
revocable by law enforcement. 
There are two reasons why this is true. First, officers may delay 
the reading of Miranda warnings in order to keep a defendant’s 
silence in play.148 Second, the government may elect to bring the 
case to state court, rather than federal court, in order to use the 
defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt. Both of these 
potential scenarios highlight the now transient nature of the privilege 
against self-incrimination in California. While “no constitutional rule 
is immutable,”149 predictability of the law ensures fairness of 
adjudication by ensuring that each criminal defendant is treated 
equally. Absent this predictability, the outcome of a criminal case 
may be determined on procedural rather than substantive grounds. 
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s decision to rule against 
the law governing the Ninth Circuit diminishes the Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent by undermining safeguards created by the 
Miranda Court. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Predictability of the law ensures fairness of adjudication by 
ensuring that each criminal defendant is treated equally. Bolstered by 
that rationale, Tom was incorrectly decided because the Court’s 
holding has the potential to lead to unfair results that are not 
in concert with the spirit of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. The rule requiring individuals under pre-Miranda 
custody to objectively and unambiguously invoke their right to 
remain silent is counterintuitive, and may produce results that run 
147. Tom II, 331 P.3d at 332 (Liu, J., dissenting) (“Given th[e] conflicting expert testimony
[as to Tom’s speed] the prosecutor’s emphasis on Tom’s failure to ask about the crash victims 
was a significant aspect of her claim that Tom ‘was driving down that night . . . without a care of 
what was going to happen. I don’t care is the attitude that he had.’”). 
148. See id. at 324 (“It simply ‘create[s] an incentive for arresting officers to delay
interrogation in order to create an intervening “silence” that could then be used against the 
defendant.’” (quoting United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
149. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
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counter to commonsense expectations. Moreover, if an individual 
must wait for the police to read him his rights in order to benefit 
from the protection of the Fifth Amendment, then the Fifth 
Amendment no longer exists as an automatic individual right. 
Rather, it becomes a privilege granted at the discretion of the police. 
Commonsense dictates that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence should 
be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. 
The risk of inferring meaning from words a defendant never 
spoke enables a prosecutor to speak on behalf of the accused. This 
kind of prosecutorial ventriloquism effectively places the accused on 
a virtual stand and forces a criminal defendant to face the “cruel 
trilemma of incriminating himself, lying, or demonstrating guilt by 
silence.”150 Accordingly, People v. Tom chips away fairness 
and predictability from the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
150. See supra Section V.B.
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